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Abstract
We exploit a national administrative dataset to estimate labor supply elasticities at the rm level,
distinguishing for the rst time the source of separation (quits versus layo¤s), which is crucial as only
the former is consistent with employees responses to changes in wages. Our results suggest that labor
supply elasticities increase by around 18% when all separations (i.e., without identifying its source) are
used instead of voluntary separations (i.e., quits). Hence, it transpires that previous literature, which
due to data constraints, did not identify the source of separations, presented results which were upward
biased, thus overestimating labor market competitiveness. We also nd that between rm di¤erences in
the gender-specic elasticities are more relevant than within rm di¤erences when voluntary separations
are used, a result that should be considered by governments in the design of their gender gap policy
agenda.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, the available literature has focused on studying the existence of discriminatory wage di¤erences
in perfectly competitive labor markets which assumes a perfectly elastic labor supply (Becker 1971). Related
literature has questioned Beckers approach, suggesting that monopsonistic power on the part of the employer
in the labor market (Robinson 1969, Madden 1973, Black 1995, Manning 2003) can explain discriminatory
behavior due to the existence of frictions in the labor market. In particular, monopsony models could explain
how discriminatory gender wage di¤erences arise and persist if rms wield greater monopsony power over
female than male workers. For this to hold, womens supply of labor to the rm must be less wage elastic
than mens.
Due to data constraints, some studies have only recently started to consider the impact that imperfect
competition in the labor market might have on the gender wage gap. Most of these analyses have been
done at the market level and using wage-separations elasticities (although they recognize that it is more
appropriate to use the wagequit elasticity, but they do not have that information). These studies found
that male elasticity is higher than females elasticity and that this di¤erence can explain around one third
of the gender wage gap [Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) for the US. and Hirsch et al. (2010) for Germany].
Webber (2016) extended the theoretical and empirical model to the rm level. Webber estimated the
male and female labor supply elasticity by rm and used them to study the gender pay gap for the U.S..
As in previous literature, Webber do not identify the reason of separations. He detects substantial search
frictions in the U.S. labor market, with females facing a higher level of frictions than males. Vick (2017)
points out that inclusion of layo¤s in the data might confuse estimates based on worker movements, thus
knowing the reason for job separations is critical, as elasticity estimates based on hazard models of quits vs.
layo¤s produce very di¤erent wage coe¢cients. In particular, he estimates the elasticity at the market level
and nds that elasticities using separations move in a di¤erent direction than quit elasticities.
We contribute to recent dynamic monopsony models and the gender gap literature by adding some key
elements. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the rst study to estimate male and female labor supply
elasticities at the rm level using the reason for job separation. We show that identication of the cause of
separation is crucial as our results suggest that by using voluntary separations, labor markets appear to be
more monopsonistic versus estimations obtained without identication of the source of separation, suggesting
an upward bias in the extant literature. Second, to our knowledge, we are the rst study that has attempted
to measure monopsony power at the rm level in middle income countries. This is relevant as the only
existing evidence at the rm level comes from the U.S., and it can be argued that market imperfections (i.e.,
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search frictions, mobility costs, etc) are more prevalent in developing countries due to higher poverty rates,
greater di¢culty in starting businesses, poorer information technologies and transportation infrastructure,
fewer education opportunities, and lower unionization rates than in the U.S.. Additionally, some empirical
literature notes that larger informal sectors and more widespread discrimination in many middle income
countries are especially harmful to female equality and mobility (Chioda 2011;World Bank 2012).
2 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the labor supply elasticity to the rm, we use a simple model of an economy with search frictions
as in Manning (2003) and Weber (2016). Following these, the labor supply elasticity at the rm level can be
expressed as:
" = R"ER + (1  
R)"NR   
S"ES   (1  
S)"NS (1)
where "ER is the elasticity of recruitment of workers from employment, "
N
R is the elasticity of recruitment
of workers from nonemployment, "ES is the elasticity of separation of workers to employment, "
N
S is the
elasticity of separation of workers to nonemployment. R and S are the share of recruits from employment
and the share of separations to employment respectively.
As discussed in the literature, the two separations elasticities can be easily estimated with duration
models (described below). However, recruitment elasticities are harder to obtain (see details in Manning
2003, chapter 4). Thus, it is handy to express recruitment elasticities as functions of estimable quantities
(see derivation in Manning (2003) chapter 4):
"ER =
 S"ES
R
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E
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This is derived from the denition of the share of total recruits which come from employment

R = R
E
RE+RN

,
where RE and RN are the recruits from employment and non-employment respectively. Taking the natural
log of each side and di¤erentiating yields equations (2) and (3). As presented in Webber (2016), the second
term of the right hand side of equation (3) can be thought of as the bargaining premium that an employee
receives from searching while currently employed.
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2.1 Estimation of the Elasticity of labor supply to the rm
To estimate the labor supply elasticity to the rm level by gender, we follow Webber (2016), who begins with
the estimation of the elasticity of separation to nonemployment ("NS ). To do this we use a Cox proportional
hazard model given by:
(t j N; sep log(earnings)i +Xi
N; sep) = 0(t)e
(N; sep log(earnings)i+Xi
N; sep) (4)
where () is the hazard function; 0 is the baseline hazard; t is the length of employment; log(earnings) is
the natural log of individual is earnings and X is a vector of explanatory variables. Workers who transition
to a new employer or who are with the same employer at the end of the data series are considered to have a
censored employment spell.  represents the estimate of the elasticity of separation to nonemployment.
The estimation of the elasticity of separation to employment ("ES ) follows an analogous setting:
(t j E; sep log(earnings)i +Xi
E; sep) = 0(t)e
(E; sep log(earnings)i+Xi
E; sep) (5)
with the only di¤erence being that the sample is restricted to those workers who do not have a job
transition to nonemployment. To estimate the premium to searching while employed

wR(w)
R(w)[1 R(w)]

we
follow Manning (2003) who shows that this is equivalent to the coe¢cient on log earnings when estimating
the following logistic regression:
Prec =
e(
E; rec log(earnings)i+Xi
E; rec)
1 + e(
E; rec log(earnings)i+XiE; rec)
(6)
where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a worker was recruited from employment and 0 if
they were recruited from nonemployment. This coe¢cient also interacts with time dummies to allow time
variation.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
To estimate the labor supply elasticity of the rm by gender, we use the full administrative Unemployment
Insurance ("Seguro de Cesantía", in Spanish) database provided by the Unemployment Fund Administrator.
By law, the Unemployment Fund Administrator is required to collect, on a monthly basis, all contributions
to unemployment individual accounts for each labor relation. To obtain our nal dataset, we removed all
spells that span fewer than 3 months, because the data do not contain information on when during the
month an individual was hired/separated, thus the entries for the rst and last month of any employment
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spell will almost certainly underestimate the monthly earnings rate (unless the individual was hired on the
rst day or left employment on the last day of a month). While this certainly eliminates short (and likely
low-wage) jobs, it also prevents us from systematically underestimating monthly wages.1 We also removed
job spells that fell in the top and bottom 1 % of earnings observations. We also limit our analysis to rms
with at least 100 total employment spells of any length over the lifespan of the rm, and 25 separations or
hirings. Finally, we also exclude rms in the agricultural sector.
The time span covered in our dataset goes from January 2010 to December 2017 and includes individual
and employer characteristics such as age, age squared, education, gender, tenure, tenure squared, region,
time of a­iation to the insurance, monthly taxable income, the reason and date of separation, industry, date
of hiring, type of contract and geographical location, among others.
The variable education has several missing observations in the Unemployment Insurance dataset which
is why we complemented it with administrative information from the Ministry of Education. In this way,
we can recover the missing information of the education variable. From information included in the online
appendix (descriptive statistics), we observe that male workers are slightly older and less educated than
female workers. Furthermore, male workers receive 34.4% higher wages than female workers and also have
shorter employment spells than female workers (17.7 months versus 20.4 months on average).
After making these restrictions, we are left with a sample of all workers for whom we can estimate a
gender-specic labor-supply elasticity. This sample is made up of roughly 6,866,636 employment spells,
belonging to about 3,212,361 unique individuals, who work at 7,357 separate rms.
4 Results
4.1 Labor Supply Elasticity by Firm and Gender
Column 1 of Table 1 reports the average (weighted by employment) rm level elasticities using voluntary
and all separations broken down by gender. It can be seen that labor supply elasticities are small (i.e. 0.56
for men and 0.45 for women in our full time varying model) suggesting a signicant market power for rms
in Chile. Our results are lower than those obtained by Weber (2016) for the U.S. (1.09 for men and 0.94 for
women) with the same methodology, suggesting that Chilean labor markets are less competitive than the
American labor market. For Chile, men should earn approximately 16% more than women as a result of
1Results do not change in a signicant way with this assumption.
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the di¤erence in labor supply elasticities ceteris paribus. 2 This di¤erence corresponds to 52.6% of the raw
earnings gap in our data.
We re-estimate the same model but now using voluntary separations only (i.e. quits). Results are
presented in column 5 of Table 1 and suggest that elasticities decrease when only quits are used (0.49 for
men and 0.38 for women). This result implies that men should earn approximately 19% more than women
as a result of the di¤erence in labor supply elasticities ceteris paribus (with all separations was 16%).This
means that using voluntary separations instead of all separations increases by almost 19% the theoretical
wage gap explained by the elasticity gap, reinforcing the relevance of identifying the cause of termination of
the labor relation.
Despite that using voluntary separations greatly increases the percentage of the theoretical earning gap
explained, elasticities are rather small suggesting that rms still do have relevant market power.These results
cannot be compared against the ndings of the previous literature, since we are the rst to estimate it. Vick
(2017) calculated this, but only at the market level, and he concluded that signs change when quits were used.
In our case we nd that there is no change of signs, although there is an important change in magnitude.
Comparing voluntary versus all separations results highlights the need to identify the nature of sepa-
rations. Such distinction helps interpret the meaning of regression coe¢cients, especially in labor markets
where quits are a small proportion of separations, as in Chile (approximately 15%). Failure to distinguish
the two potentially biases elasticity estimates away from zero and might fail to capture gender di¤erences in
worker separation decisions.
4.2 Distribution of Labor Supply Elasticity by Firm and Gender
Now we turn to analyze the di¤erences between and within rms. Results are presented in Table 1 for both
cases (all separations and voluntary separations). Columns 2, 3 and 4 present results for the 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles of the distribution of estimated rm level labor supply elasticities. It can be noted that
the results presented in columns 1 and 5 are larger than those presented in columns 3 and 7 which implies
that the mean is higher than the median which is consistent with the right skewed distribution of estimated
elasticities.
A second interesting result is that, when looking within rms percentiles, there are important gender
2This number is calculated using wm =
p
@Q(Em;Ef )
@Em
1+ 1
"m
 and wf =
p
@Q(Em;Ef )
@Ef
1+ 1
"f
 which are obtained after solving the rms
prot maximization problem.
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di¤erences in lower percentiles (0.19 for men and 0.00 for women for the 25th percentile when all separations
are used). A di¤erence that becomes smaller as we move up in the distribution (0.50 for men and 0.43 for
women for the 50th percentile) and reverses in the upper part of the distribution (0.89 for men and 0.99 for
women for the 75th percentile). The same pattern is observable when only quits are used.
We also observe from Table 1 that di¤erences across rms in the elasticity gap are much bigger than
di¤erences within rms. For example, when all separations are used, the higher within elasticity gap di¤erence
appears in the 25th percentile with 0.19 and 0.00 for men and women respectively (a di¤erence of 0.19). This
di¤erence is much smaller than the 0.7 and the 0.99 obtained between 75th-25th percentile for men and
women respectively. This same pattern is observed when quits are used instead of all separations.
4.3 Between and Within Firms Di¤erences
We do a complementary analysis to further investigate between versus within rms di¤erences in gender-
specic elasticities. For this analysis we use a sample of rms which only includes individuals who work at
rms where we were able to estimate both, a male and a female labor-supply elasticity. This sample has
6,107,800 employment spells, belonging to 3,169,239 unique individuals, who work at 6,985 separate rms.
In the upper panel of column 1 in Table 2 we calculate the di¤erence among these gender-specic elasticities
suggesting, in our prefered model (full model time varying), that, on average, male elasticities between rms
are 0.1 higher than female elasticities. In the second panel of column 1 in Table 2 we present within rms
di¤erences which is calculated by taking the di¤erence between male and female elasticities for each rm
and then taking the average of the di¤erences across rms. Results of our prefered model (full model time
varying) suggest that on average male elasticities is 0.09 higher than female elasticities within rms, which
suggests that when all separations are used there are no major di¤erences in the elasticity gap between and
within rms. However, when voluntary separations are used (column 2 in Table 2), between rms di¤erences
are more than twice the magnitude of within rms di¤erences (in our prefered model). In other words, when
voluntary separations are used between rms di¤erences in elasticities are more important than within rms
di¤erences in elasticities.
This is a relevant result as regulations targeted at rms might be able to help address the gender gap,
however it seems that the gender wage gap is driven more by structural factors that generate gender sorting
to rms. This result is in line with Card et al. (2016) and Cruz and Rau (2017) for Portugal and Chile
respectively whom, using a di¤erent approach, nd that most of the wage gap is explained by sorting and a
smaller part by bargaining power within rms.
6
5 Conclusions
The gender wage gap has been studied for decades, but usually from the perfect competition approach (Becker
1971). Models of imperfect competition (i.e., dynamic monopsony models) have only been recently applied to
this topic. Moreover, due to data constraints, only recently empirical studies have attempted to analyze the
gender wage gap using dynamic monopsony models; although most of these perform a market level analysis.
An exception to this is Weber (2016), who estimates labor supply elasticities at the rm level for the US.. Due
to data constraints, this study uses separations without identifying the source of separation. We contribute
to the literature by being the rst study that estimates labor supply elasticities using voluntary separations
(i.e., quits). In particular, we estimate labor supply elasticities at the rm level for Chile (as Weber 2016
does for the US.) but also by identifying the source of separation (i.e. using voluntary separations). We
nd that using all separations increases the labor supply elasticities at the rm level by 18% relative to
those found when voluntary separations are used. Thus, we nd that using separations without identifying
its source might bias results upward, suggesting that labor markets are more competitive than what they
really are. Furthermore, when voluntary separations are used we nd that between rm di¤erences in the
gender-specic elasticities are more relevant than within rm di¤erences suggesting a relevant role of gender
sorting to rms.
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Appendix
Table 1
Estimated Firm-level Labor Supply Elasticities and their Distribution
All Separations Voluntary Separations
Model Mean 25th 50th 75th Mean 25th 50th 75th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male Elasticities
Earnings only 1.05 0.61 0.94 1.45 0.96 0.42 0.80 1.42
No education controls 0.58 0.26 0.52 0.86 0.52 0.13 0.43 0.91
Full model 0.53 0.20 0.47 0.82 0.48 0.07 0.39 0.85
Full model time varying 0.56 0.19 0.50 0.89 0.49 0.00 0.39 0.92
Female Elasticities
Earnings only 1.03 0.52 1.00 1.55 0.97 0.32 0.97 1.55
No education controls 0.44 0.02 0.38 0.88 0.41 0.00 0.37 0.98
Full model 0.45 0.02 0.38 0.91 0.38 0.00 0.34 0.97
Full model time varying 0.45 0.00 0.43 0.99 0.38 0.00 0.37 1.09
Three separate regressions, corresponding to equations (4)(6), were estimated separately by gender for each rm in the
data that met the conditions described in the Data section. The coe¢cients on log earnings in each regression were combined,
weighted by the share of recruits and separations to employment to obtain the estimate of the labor supply elasticity to the
rm. The rst row of each panel represents estimates from equations where the only regressor in each model is log earnings.
Second row also includes: age; age-squared; tenure, tenure squared, region, type of contract, number of employees working
at the rm and industry indicator variables. Third row includes all previous controls plus indicator variables for education
level. Year e¤ects are included in all models. The rst three rows report only the long-run elasticities, while the fourth row
describes the elasticities when a steady-state is not assumed, and they are allowed to vary over time (i.e. the short
run elasticity of Manning (2003)).The rst column reports the rm labor-supply elasticity calculated with separations (i.e.
voluntary and involuntary separations) while the fth reports the same but using voluntary separations only (i.e. quits).
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Table 2
Di¤erences in labor Supply Elasticities
(Between and within rms)
All Separations Voluntary Separations
Mean Mean
(1) (5)
Di¤erences Between Firms
Earnings only 0.02 -0.07
No education controls 0.14 0.09
Full model 0.08 0.06
Full model time varying 0.10 0.07
Di¤erences Within Firms
Earnings only 0.03 -0.04
No education controls 0.06 0.01
Full model 0.03 0.03
Full model time varying 0.09 0.03
Note: Between rms di¤erences among men and woman are obtained using rms that only includes individuals who work
at rms where we were able to estimate both a male and female labor-supply elasticity. We take the average male elasticity
between rms and substract the average female elasticity between rms. Within rms di¤erences are obtained by taking the
di¤erence between male and female elasticities for each rm and then taking the average of the di¤erences across rms. The
sample includes workers who work at rms where we can identify both a male and female elasticity. This sample has 6,107,800
employment spells, belonging to 3,169,239 unique individuals, who work at 6,985 separate rms.
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Online Appendix
Descriptive Statistics
Male Female
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Unit of Observation: Employment Spell (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age (Years) 35.2 11.6 34.6 10.5
High School 0.29 0.46 0.23 0.44
High School Diploma 0.57 0.49 0.61 0.49
Some College 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22
College Degree+ 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.29
Spell Duration 17.7 24.4 20.4 26.5
Log(wages) 2.97 0.60 2.67 0.56
Wages (UF) 23.6 16.2 17.4 13.5
Observations 4,467,641 2,398,995
Note: Summary statistics by gender of our nal sample from the "Seguro de Cesantía" administrative records complemented
with the administrative records from the Ministry of Education.
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